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The Baltic states -Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -have achieved substantial economic success since they regained independence in 1991. Market economies were established, living standards have increased and a high degree of macroeconomic stability has been attained. These achievements were crowned by the admittance of the countries into the European Union in 2004 and to the euro area starting in 2011.
In spite of these achievements, the Baltic states have income levels substantially below those in developed or high-income economies. In 2014 per capita GDP at purchasing power standards (PPS), i.e. adjusted for different price levels in the countries, was 43-50 per cent of the level in the USA, 51-59 per cent of the level in neighbouring Sweden and 60-69 per cent of the average in the EU15. The Baltic economies grew rapidly before the global fi nancial crisis and in particular during the years [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Economic growth slowed, however, in the aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis, and the speed of income convergence has consequently been modest.
Many emerging economies have experienced spurts of rapid economic growth that have narrowed the gap with high-income economies, only to see this growth taper off and the process of convergence slow down. Many of these economies have had per capita incomes rise to and then stabilise at around half of the US level, and only a dozen emerging economies have succeeded in actually narrowing the income gap to attain essentially the living standards of developed economies.
1 Such a scenario with low trend growth and slow or non-existent convergence has been labelled the middle-income trap. This paper discusses whether the Baltic states might become caught in a middle-income trap. Such an outcome may be self-reinforcing, as unfavourable prospects may reduce investment in physical capital, human capital and organisational advancement. The paper focuses on the Baltic states, but much of the discussion may also be applicable to other EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and to some Southern European countries severely affected by the global fi nancial crisis.
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The middle-income trap
It is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly discuss the complexities of economic development, but some background may prove useful. Economic theory predicts that countries with low income levels will see fast economic growth and that consequently income levels will gradually converge with the income levels of the developed high-income countries. Such a convergence process can be driven by several factors. Since a low-income country typically will have a small stock of physical capital, the returns to capital will be high, which will stimulate capital accumulation. Low-income countries may also benefi t from the import of capital, technology and knowhow from developed countries. The result would be a process of convergence or catching-up, with higher rates of economic growth in low-income countries than in highincome ones.
Economic growth is in practice a result of many overlapping processes.
2 Resources must be reallocated from production activities with low productivity to those with high productivity. More input in the form of physical capital and skills can lead to increased production per worker. Finally, existing inputs may be utilised more effectively, leading to growth in total factor productivity (TFP). Economic growth will typically involve greater complexity in society and the increased use and development of technology. Economic development is thus dependent on the ability of societies to facilitate and manage increasing complexity and to ensure the continuous improvement of education, training, research and innovation. The narrowing or closing of the income gap envisaged by theory does not always bear out in practice. This is most clearly illustrated by the growth problems experienced in many countries in Africa and South Asia where incomes levels have remained very low over decades. Slow or nonexisting convergence, however, has also been observed for middle-income countries with per capita GDP adjusted for different price levels at, say, 20-50 per cent of the US level. 3 This has been acknowledged for many Latin American countries for a while. Figure 1 shows the GDP per capita (PPS) for a number of Latin American countries for 1980-2014. Income levels in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have remained at 30-40 per cent of the level in the USA, and there is little to no evidence of convergence over more than three decades.
The countries in Southeast Asia have typically performed better. Figure 2 shows GDP per capita (PPS) for Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. The countries have all seen their income gaps with the USA narrow since 1980, and for Hong Kong the gap was all but eliminated by 2010. A closer inspection reveals, however, a more complex picture. Economic growth was generally fast in the period until 1997, but all four countries experienced deep output declines in 1998 after the outbreak of the Asian crisis. Economic growth resumed at a rapid pace in Hong Kong and Korea (as well as in Singapore, which is not included in the fi gure). However, this has not been the case in Malaysia and Thailand, where the convergence processes have generally been quite slow since 1998. In 2014 GDP per capita in Malaysia and Thailand relative 
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to the USA was at essentially the same level as it was in 1997.
The issue of some hitherto fast-growing countries suddenly experiencing lower rates of growth and consequently slow or non-existing convergence was fi rst labelled the "middle-income trap" in a study published by the World Bank. 4 The study considered the experiences of many Asian countries and found that while some had succeeded in making the transition from middle income to high income country, others had not. The issue gained renewed impetus after the global fi nancial crisis as growth prospects deteriorated in many emerging economies. The possibility of a middle-income trap has since been discussed in a large number of studies.
5
A drop in GDP growth is typically associated with a corresponding slowdown in TFP growth. 6 The slowdown is likely to appear in a situation where "easy" productivity gains from sectoral reallocation, imports of foreign technology and surging domestic demand are exhausted.
Some analysts posit that the risk of a middle-income trap should not be overstated. 7 As the gap between an emerging economy and the high income economies narrows, the "advantage of backwardness" is reduced and economic growth will slow down. Moreover, growth rates are bound to vary over time, and periods of lower growth may be succeeded by periods with higher rates of growth. The upshot is that a wide range of outcomes are possible for the convergence process of a middle-income country, though this, of course, includes the possibility of an extended slowdown in growth.
The term "trap" suggests that the middle income outcome may be the result of self-fulfi lling or self-reinforcing mechanisms. Agénor and Canuto develop a model with two rational expectations equilibria -one that results in middle income and the other in high income. Vol. 90, No. 3, 2008, pp. 582-587 . See also B. E i c h e n g r e e n , D. P a r k , K. S h i n : Growth slowdowns…, op. cit. 7 See for instance L. P r i t c h e t t , L.H. S u m m e r s : Asiaphoria meets regression to the mean, NBER Working Paper, No. W20573, 2014. 8 P.-R. A g é n o r, O. C a n u t o , op. cit. nism works as follows: a middle-income economy is engaged in relatively simple production activities and mainly employs workers with relatively basic education levels, while a high-income economy is engaged in design, innovation and advanced production activities and to that end employs many highly skilled workers. Individuals in the middle-income economy have little incentive to invest in education, because only few highly educated workers are suitably employed in this economy. Concurrently, the fi rms operating in the middle-income economy cannot move into highly productive innovation and design activities, because there are so few highly educated workers available. The outcome is a country trapped as a middle-income economy. In the high-income economy, on the other hand, individuals have an incentive to invest in education and the fi rms can engage in highly productive activities, as they have ample access to highly educated workers. According to this line of reasoning, the middleincome trap is essentially the result of a coordination problem.
There are likely to be many mechanisms through which a middle-income trap can emerge.
9 Advanced infrastructure such as communication and transportation networks may not benefi t a middle-income economy very much, and there is therefore little incentive to invest in improving the infrastructure. However, this may make it more difficult for the economy to become a high-income economy. The same line of reasoning may apply for measures to improve enforcement of intellectual property rights, reduce corruption, improve business practices or ensure the fl exible labour markets required in a knowledge-based economy.
There is empirical evidence suggesting that these coordination problems may indeed have been important factors behind growth slowdowns observed across the world. A 2013 paper by Eichengreen et al. uses data for the period 1957-2010 and identifi es a substantial number of growth slowdowns. 10 The authors estimate probit models to ascertain which factors explain growth slowdowns. For example, a fi nancial crisis appears to increase the probability of a slowdown. A high share of the population having completed tertiary education lowers the probability of the country experiencing a growth slowdown, whereas the share of the population with secondary education is unimportant. A large share of high technology in exports appears to reduce the risk of the middle-income trap. A large old-age dependency burden increases the probability of a slowdown. It may be envisaged that many of these Baltic States factors affect medium-term growth due to their effects on investment and TFP growth.
A 2013 paper by a number of IMF economists uses a large sample of 138 countries from 1955-2009 and identifi es episodes of growth slowdowns and then the determinants of those slowdowns.
11 Using the full sample, it is found that the probability of a growth slowdown decreases if institutions are strong, if the old-age dependency ratio is low, if the macroeconomic environment is strong, if the investment share is high, and if production and trade are diversifi ed. Moreover, using a subsample of only middleincome countries, it emerges that a small government sector and highly developed infrastructure may also reduce the probability of a growth slowdown. The robustness of the results is corroborated using Bayesian model averaging, but the estimations are in any case subject to substantial data and methodology problems. already turned negative in Estonia in the second half of 2007. In all three countries, GDP declined by approximately 14 per cent in 2009, a deeper decline than in other EU countries. GDP growth bounced back in 2010 and 2011, but these relatively high growth rates were shortlived and GDP growth since then has been at subdued levels. The 2015 spring forecast by the European Commission projects annual growth rates of two to three per cent in 2015 and 2016, only marginally above the projected growth rates of the EU15. The upshot is that the Baltic states have seen a marked decline in their economic growth rates since the onset of global fi nancial crisis.
Economic growth and convergence in the Baltic states
The dynamics of economic growth are mirrored in the countries' income levels, as illustrated by the series of GDP per capita (PPS) in Figure 4 . In 1995 the income levels in the Baltic states were just over 20 per cent of the US level, with Latvia having the lowest income of the three. In 2014 the income levels were around 40-50 per cent of the US level, with Latvia still worst off in relative terms.
Three important observations can be made from Figure 4 . First, the large GDP declines in 2009 (and in 2008 as well for Estonia) are clearly visible. The global fi nancial crisis led to an immediate reversal of the convergence process, and trend output has not yet returned to its pre-crisis trajectory. Second, cultural and communication links mean that the Baltic states often compare themselves with the neighbouring Nordic countries. There seems to have been only very modest convergence to the income level of Sweden since the outbreak of the global fi nancial crisis. Finally, there has been some convergence to the EU15 income level since the crisis, but this is mainly due to the weak economic performance of the EU15 countries. 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 
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The conclusion is that the Baltic states have performed well overall since regaining independence and introducing market economies. Economic growth has been high on average, though also very volatile. The period 2011-2014 following the global fi nancial crisis was marked by modest growth and slow convergence, and this trend is forecast to continue beyond 2015. These observations raise the question of whether the Baltic states will return to the rapid economic growth of the pre-crisis period or whether the countries are at risk of becoming caught in a middle-income trap.
Assessing the risks
The theoretical and empirical literature discussed above provides largely overlapping lists of factors that may increase the likelihood of a country becoming caught in a middle-income trap. This section discusses the extent to which these factors may be relevant for the Baltic states.
An important fi nding in the literature is that long-lasting growth slowdowns have often occurred after fi nancial crises. The Baltic states were strongly affected by the global fi nancial crisis. Figure 5 shows the current account balances of the three countries. The current account defi cits were very large until 2008 and particularly so during the pre-crisis boom. The global fi nancial crisis led to reversals, and all three countries had current account surpluses in 2009, an extreme example of a sudden stop.
12 Since 2010 the current accounts have been close to balanced each year. The dynamics of GDP growth were inversely related to the developments of the current account balances during the period 1995-2014. Figure 6 shows a cross plot of the current account balance and rate of economic growth for the Baltic states. The pre-crisis boom was in large part facilitated by very large capital infl ows stimulating domestic consumption and investment demand. 13 The sudden stop was a key factor in the immediate and dramatic GDP decline.
14 Economic growth in the countries appears highly dependent on the availability of foreign capital and is thus vulnerable to fi nancial crises that affect capital infl ows. The high growth rates before the crisis did not refl ect longer-term growth potential, as they were partly driven by demand impulses from large capital infl ows.
Returning to the list of factors that may increase the likelihood of a country being caught in a middle-income trap, several others may be of importance for the Baltic states. Education, and in particular tertiary education, is likely to be an important factor. According to Eurostat, spending on education in the Baltic states is generally somewhat below the spending in the EU15, particularly in the neighbouring Nordic countries. 15 In 2014 the share of the population aged 25-64 with a tertiary degree was 38.8 per cent in Estonia, 30.2 per cent in Latvia and 36.7 in Lithu- Although the statistics indicate that the countries have well-educated populations, it must be noted that the tertiary education systems in the Baltic states (and other CEE countries) are very heterogeneous, and this may affect the scope and the quality of the education provided.
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A large part of the population was trained in Soviet times, and the skills acquired at that time may not fully correspond to those required in a rapidly changing society. The Eurostudent IV survey reveals that tertiary students in Estonia and Latvia generally spend little time on attending classes and studying, but they spend a lot of time working (for pay). 17 This pattern is particularly pronounced for postgraduate students. Estonia and Latvia are the two countries in the survey where master's students spend the most time at paid work -27 hours per week on average.
In the 1990s, the exports of the Baltic states gradually evolved from products produced in low-skilled sectors to products produced in medium-skilled sectors.
18 Even so, high-tech products comprise a relatively small share of total exports compared to the shares in other CEE countries like the Czech Republic and Hungary. It is also notable that much of the high-tech exports are only assembled in the Baltic states and often contain little domestic value added. The relatively unsophisticated export structure of the Baltic states has changed little since the global fi nancial crisis.
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Measures of institutional quality in the Baltic states have seen improvement over time and in 2013 were on par with those for Southern European countries, but they are still below those of the best performing countries in Northern Europe. This applies to measures such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Finally, the Baltic states have seen a rapid increase in the old-age dependency rate, which may curtail dynamism and increase the likelihood of a middle-income trap arising. According to Eurostat, the old-age dependency ratio is slightly below the EU average, but it is set to increase rapidly in the coming decades, and this trend may be aggravated if emigration continues to reduce the size of the working-age population.
The conclusion is that the Baltic states display a number of features that may make them vulnerable to the middleincome trap. The countries have gone through an exceptionally severe economic and fi nancial crisis, the education sector exhibits weaknesses, production and export are tilted towards low-tech goods, the institutional quality is lacking, and the populations are ageing. None of these factors will necessarily prevent a return to fast economic growth and rapid convergence, but they do point to some challenges faced by policymakers in the Baltic states.
Policy challenges
The theory and the empirical studies discussing the middle-income trap are useful starting points for the discussion of policies that could increase the potential growth of the Baltic states. The premise is that to raise growth, the production processes in the Baltic states must move up the value chains. This requires a change from simple manufacturing and services sold in competition with producers from low-cost countries to production with substantial levels of research and development, innovation and design content. Such a move would bring knowledge, agglomeration and specialisation rents, enabling the provision of high compensation to the production factors employed. 21 This transformation, moving up the value chain, may be facilitated by investments in capital equipment, human capital and innovation, and by ensuring a conducive and stable economic environment.
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Knowledge-based production requires investment in people and human capital. This calls for reforms strengthening education and skill accumulation at all levels, especially the tertiary level. Universities and tertiary schools should be international leaders and benchmark their performance against top Western institutions, and students 21 R. B a l d w i n , S.J. E v e n e t t : Value creation and trade in 21st century manufacturing, in: Journal of Regional Science, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2015, pp. 31-50. 22 See for instance P.-R. A g é n o r, O. C a n u t o , M. J e l e n i c , op. cit.; A.
F o x l e y, F. S o s s d o r f : Making the transition from middle-income to advanced economies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011; H. K h a r a s , H. K o h l i : What is the middle income trap, why do countries fall into it, and how can it be avoided?, in: Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011, pp. 281-289. 
